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40 p. 23^{cm}.

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

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

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
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


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THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AT STOCKHOLM.

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PRINTED BY

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO., PHILADELPHIA.

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IN his preface to the Latin edition of Swedenborg's "*De Anima*" Dr. Emanuel Tafel mentions a short tract entitled "*De Ontologia*," which was bound in the same MS. volume with the larger treatise. The publication of this tract, Dr. Tafel says, was omitted at the time in deference to the wishes of the Swedenborg Society, yet he deemed it of such importance that he gave its table of contents in the preface before mentioned. This special notice in so distinguished a quarter, and the ready access given to Swedenborg's posthumous MSS. by the Photolithographic copies of them, so ably edited by Dr. R. L. Tafel, led to the transcription and translation of the tract. The generosity of a Boston gentleman,* who had seen a notice of its contents, supplied the means for its publication.

It is believed that the treatise will be useful in more clearly defining certain philosophical terms in frequent use throughout Swedenborg's scientific writings. Although it was probably written at some period prior to the author's illumination, it seems quite reasonable to infer that the meaning of those terms remained essentially the same in his Theological works.

The translator is quite aware of imperfections in his performance. His task, though brief, was not an easy one. The handwriting of the original is in parts so obscure that there are still a few passages in which the text has not been determined beyond

* Rev. Wm. R. Alger.

doubt. Moreover, in subjects so purely abstract, perfect accuracy and perspicuity are difficult of attainment. If these have been at all approached, it is largely owing to the able assistance of friends who have kindly reviewed both the Latin transcription and the subsequent version. Without desiring to render them responsible for his own short-comings, the translator acknowledges his obligations to Dr. S. H. Worcester, of Bridgewater, Mass., and Prest. F. Sewall, of Urbana University.

URBANA, OHIO, Nov. 6th, 1880.

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ONTOLOGY.*

CHAPTER I.

FORM—FORMAL CAUSE.

FORM is divided into *external* and *internal*. *External* or *extrinsic* form is that which is outside of the essence of a substance. Thus indeed every accidental form might be called an external form; but by extrinsic form we understand an exemplary cause or idea, according to the likeness of which an effect is produced. *Intrinsic* form is that which constitutes the thing formed either substantial or accidental. *Accidental* form is that which exists in a substance, whether that substance be spiritual or material, and which, together with that substance, in which it exists, constitutes an accidental compound. *Intrinsic substantial form* is either forming or assisting. When *forming*, it is either regarded as one part of a physical compound, and is then called the form of that part, or it is regarded as the whole of whatever belongs to any given substance, and is then called the form of the whole. Thus the whole essence of the natural body is called its form in this sense. Of *form separable from matter* there exists only one example, namely, the rational soul. *Inseparable form* is that which is so bound to matter that it cannot exist or operate outside of matter. This also makes generic and specific forms. *Assisting* form is that which does not actuate or form its own matter, but only assists it, bestowing upon it motion and operation. Form, in a wider acceptation of the term, is divided into *metaphysical*

* See vol. vi., pp. 323-342, Photolith.

and *physical*. *Metaphysical form*, in the sense of essence, is the whole essence of a substantial thing, or, according to others, its entire nature. No form constitutes a compound, except in conjunction with matter of some kind. Some have asserted that form pre-exists in matter before the generation of a thing. Others have said that forms are actually in matter before things are generated; nevertheless, that they do not appear, but, during the confusion of the forces resident in matter, they, as it were, lie hid, and become manifest by means of generation: as for instance, the plant, in the matter of a seed. Others have asserted that before generation, form has actual *esse* in matter, imperfect indeed, and as it were, inchoate; but that, by means of generation, form begins to be in matter according to its perfect *esse*. Still others have said that all substantial forms are made anew by the act of creation. The Peripatetic philosophers taught that certain substantial forms are spiritual and independent of matter, though truly forming it; but that there are other material forms so inherent in matter, that they depend upon it for their creation and being. Of the former kind are human souls alone. ROBERT BARON, *Metaphysics*.

Form is substance incomplete and imperfect, or half-substance, but joined to matter it becomes substance entire. Form is described as a second principle, second part, or second ingredient of natural things. These regard not the potency of form, but its actuality, which latter it derives from matter. Aristotle says that form desires matter as the female does the male. Form is that which not only gives *esse* to things, but which also makes them diverse, and distinguishes one from another.

DUPLEIX.

Essential determinations are what is commonly called *form*, likewise also *formal cause*. He understands the form of the human body, who understands, not only its structure, consequently the figures of its organic parts, and the manner in which they are joined together, but also the combination of similar parts, whence the organic parts are composed. Similarly, he understands the form of a stone, who knows by what combination the particles are produced and in what manner they are joined together in order that the mass of the stone may

result. An *ens* derives from its form the fact that it is of a given genus or species, and that it is distinguished from others. From form also an *ens* derives the power of acting in a given manner. Form must be regarded as among the causes of things, for by means of its form we understand why an *ens* is such as it is, rather than something else, and why it is suited to act in a given manner. Consequently, the reason of these things is contained in the form. It is therefore the principle upon which the *ens* depends, that it may exist such as it is; consequently it is a cause of the *ens*. In this respect essential determinations are called form. Form is, therefore, the principle of the actuality of the *ens*, upon which doubtless depends the existence of the *ens* as such; so that form and essence are thus distinguished from each other, although each of these is constituted by essential determinations; in a different respect however from that which they have to the *ens* itself.

WOLF.

Form is the entire construction of a body, embracing the composition, co-ordination, subordination, and determination of its parts, whether these be integral parts or the individual parts of a compound, whence that compound derives not only its essence but the quality of its essence. For from the form is derived the fact that the *ens* is such as it is found to be; so that from a knowledge of the form, there follows also a knowledge of the quality and essence of any given body, besides also of its dependence and relation to others. For such knowledge involves that of its connexions, position, its order, its fluxion, and many other things, which cause the body to be such as it is, rather than something else. In compounds and in bodies there are matters, or things which flow from matters, and which determine the form. For form, without matter, in corporeal things, is a mere imaginary entity or an idea which does not really exist. Hence, by some all that is called matter by which form is determined: so that where form is, there is matter; for, that a

thing be a form at all, this it derives from matter. The result is that three principles are established, namely, matter, form, and the privation of form. All that is matter from which is form, but the word material has a different sense so far as it is opposed to spiritual.

Spiritual form, on the other hand, cannot be called a construction, composition, or determination of parts, for all these are terms which apply to forms purely material and corporeal. Yet in spiritual forms there must be understood a certain determination, yea also an ordination of entities and of forces flowing thence, which bear an analogy and a certain correspondence to those which exist in bodies. For spiritual forms and their operations exceed all ideas which are material, or which are joined to material things, yea even the very words by which those ideas are expressed. For there exist higher analogies which are too unlimited and too undefined to be expressed by them. Moreover spiritual forms have this in common with others, that spirits derive from their form the fact that they are such as they are understood to be; and this is the reason why there is given such a variety of spirit, or of spiritual forms.

In the mean time Simple forms, or forms simply considered, are superior and inferior; of which some, or all, may occur in a compound form; as, in the animal body, in which forms simply considered are all contained; and because we cannot understand of what quality corporeal form can be, without the understanding of simple forms, therefore these latter must be explained.

External form is taken in two senses: first as inferior form; for inferior form is always exterior, and superior is always interior. Thus the rational mind is an internal form, while the body is an external form; or, cause is internal form and effect is external form: since, indeed, effect reveals, as in an image, its own cause. Under *external form* also are included

the outward construction and determination of the body, whence are derived its comeliness or deformity, its beauty and loveliness. This external-form is equally the image of the internal form, for in like manner as form has its determinations, so also it should have its terminations, which truly correspond with its internal determination. For example, every circular form must consist of perpetual circles as its parts; and the common circle itself, by its own determination indicates what its internal form is. Thus internal and external forms will correspond. Otherwise an angular form might externally assume the circular form, or even the spiral, not however of itself or of its own nature, but from art. From its very hardness, coldness, or resistance, it appears that the form itself is angular. It must therefore be seen whether the internal form produces naturally the external, thus whether they correspond, or whether some more perfect form have been superinduced upon it: as, for instance, the human form impressed or engraved upon wax, marble, or brass. That a form may be truly human, in every smallest part there must be something human, or inspired with a human soul.

Everything must have its own form, that there may be something from whence is derived its actuality or essence, its *quiddity* (a word I would like), its quality, causality, and its very faculty of acting and being acted upon. Thus a thing without form is an atom of no principle, that is nothing. Each thing, mode, sense, or force has its own form. Every body, viscus, or part, whether solid or fluid, as the blood, the animal spirit, yea the soul itself, has its form. Every society, least and greatest, has its own form of government, its dependence and relation to others, its order, laws, and other things, which are determined along with its form.

CHAPTER II.

FIGURE.

IN a compound, which is not continuous, all the parts have a determined position with regard to each other. The boundary of an extent is called figure. A finite compound *ens* is endowed with a certain figure. A compound *ens* in imaginary space, in which it is supposed to exist, designates a figure agreeing with its own; a plane figure if its own be plane; a hollow figure if its own be convex; and a convex figure if its own be concave. If to a compound *ens* certain parts be added, or if from the same any be taken away or transposed, and in the boundary of its extent anything occurs which was different before, the figure of those parts is changed. But if nothing then occurs which was not in the same manner comprehended under their former boundary, their figure is not changed. Figure is an accident; for figure is not a modifiable *ens*. For since figure is the boundary of an extent, we cannot conceive any other change in it, than that it be taken away, or that another be substituted in its place. Indeed we can by no means conceive that it possesses intrinsic determinations, of which some are changed into others, while still others remain the same, nor consequently that it is like a subject which is capable of diverse determinations, since such a subject is the extent which is limited; but the boundary of the same is not so. Therefore figure is an accident.

WOLF'S ONTOLOGY.

Figure appears as though it might signify external form, but there is a difference between them. External form refers itself to its internal as to something continuous with it; as, for example, the expression of the face, of the actions and of the speech, to the mind. In so far as the face itself is regarded as the external form of the human head, and refers itself to the internal form of the same, it must not be called a figure; but in so far as it is taken separately from that

form, and indeed is regarded as a surface, which belongs to planometry, it is called a figure; wherefore there is given a figure of the face, a figure of the mouth, of the nose, of the eye; but the form involves all these at once. In Geometrics, figure differs from form as a plane from a cube, and the peculiar nature of figure is like that of a geometric figure considered as regards its integral construction and its nature resulting thence, being that of a compound. Thus form is withdrawn from figure, the more it is raised to the higher powers, as, for instance, to the cube of a square, and the cube of a cube, and so on: for these are far removed from the measure of plane surfaces. So also there are superior forms, which cannot be called figured forms, because they are not bounded by space within themselves, but only by imaginary space without themselves: for in order that they may include space in themselves, there must be reference to some centre, superficies or diameter; and further, when these perish, as they do when such determinations exist, then perishes also the idea of space; because in form itself, there is no idea of space, but the latter can be conceived of as outside of it. Such form also is free from figure, because it is free from space and extent; moreover it is without every limitation. Thus superior forms gradually recede from the idea of space and figure, as they are more highly elevated. Therefore, *as determinations regarded as within a space constitute form, so terminations regarded as it were without that space, constitute figure.* On the other hand, in a form of which there are given no terminations, except such forms as may be regarded as continuous, the figure itself must be ideally conceived as without that form, and not, as though it were adjoined to it. For a form which occupies no space regarded as such in itself, cannot be said to be terminated, but its terminus, or its every termination, must be conceived as occupying space outside of that form.

CHAPTER III.

ORGAN—STRUCTURE.

AN organic body, by virtue of its composition, is suited to its own peculiar action. A simple organic body is one which is composed of no other organic parts. The reverse is true of a compound organic body. The essence of an organic body consists in its structure. The reason of those things which enter into an organic body, in so far as it is organic, whether they are actually in it, or may be in it, is contained in its structure. In that same structure ought to be contained a sufficient reason why the organic body is suited to an action of that peculiar kind. If the parts of an organic body consist of mixed matter, and the mixture of it be in any manner dissolved, the organic body perishes.

WOLF.

Structure is the same as form, but only in compounds, which are physically and mechanically considered, and to which are attributed parts, space, extent, mass, magnitude, matter, weight, motion, figure, and the like; but form is something more universal and is given also in more simple things, yea in the most simple, with the proviso, nevertheless that structure corresponds with it. For such things, as those above mentioned, must be conceived as residing in each and every form, although they be not actually in it, but in their stead certain analogous and more interior qualities, which cannot be so named or to which such predicates do not apply.

An organ is an instrument and supposes some principle or principal cause by which it is brought into action; so that it does not possess in itself a principle of action, unless so far as it derives it from another cause holding the chief place. The human body is purely organic, the soul being its active princi-

ple. In like manner the body consists of an unbroken series of organs or instruments of the active soul. The term organic is properly predicated of the parts of the animal kingdom. The term instrument belongs to things without life.

CHAPTER IV.

STATE—CHANGES OF STATE.

FROM the determination of the changeable properties of a thing arises its *state*, so that state is the co-existence of changeable properties, with the same in a fixed condition. If state consist of intrinsic changeable properties, namely, of modes, it is called internal; if of extrinsic properties, such as are the relations of the thing to other things, it is called external state. If the same changeable properties exist in two things, A and B, their states are the same: if diverse, their states are diverse. If the changeable properties, which are predicated of a thing, do not remain the same, its state is changed. The internal state of a thing is changed if its modes do not remain the same; but its external state is changed if its relations to other things do not remain the same. A finite *ens* may have now some states and then others, but it cannot have all at the same time. WOLF.

State is the co-existence of determinations in any given form; as, in the circle, the co-existence of the determination of the diameters from the circumference towards the centre. The state of the circle is not changed so long as the circle remains a circle. When the circle is expanded and contracted, then its state is not changed, but its forces are varied and modified, or, in other words, there is a variation and modification of its forces, from which variation and modification new forms and new states are wont to be formed, the essence of the

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circle remaining the same. From such variation in the animal body vital actions are produced; and in the atmospheric world, modifications, which, in the sensory organs, become sensations.

Changes of state are changes of determinations in any given form in respect to their co-existence; as, in circular forms, in respect to the co-existence of their determinations, that is, of the radii towards the centre; thus, when the determination of the centre is changed, the state of the circle is changed, as when it is transformed into an ellipse, a cycloid, a conoid, a parabola, and other figures. So also it is with all other forms, except in angular forms, where there is no change of form without its destruction and removal; there is only given a change of figure. These changes of state are called changes of modes; for these changes themselves produce among themselves new forms, which are properly called modifications, but in the animal body, sensations. By means of such changes imaginations are effected, for these are so many ideas, which are reproduced by similar changes of state. For this reason modifications correspond to sensations: for changes are either of forces or of modes. The perfection of superior forms consists in mutability of state, or of states; for the soul, from any change of any organic form in its own body, understands the state of it and what it signifies; for, without change of some kind, no sensation is given and no perception, still less any action. From changes of state, or variation of modes, new forms exist, thus successively, before they do simultaneously, or before they co-exist; for, there may be given common states, under which are contained many particular ones,—universal states, beneath which are singular ones,—and general states, including specific and individual ones. A common and universal state is formed from those which are particular and singular. There are equations which are composed suc-

cessively by reasonings and analogies. On the same principle we reason, that, while in finite existences there can be given several states at the same time which are not self-created, there are infinitely more in superior forms.

CHAPTER V.

SUBSTANCE.

WOLF. Substance is an indestructible and modifiable subject; or it is the subject of intrinsic determinations constant and variable; or, substance is a subject in which the essentials and attributes are the same, while its modes are successively varied. ARISTOTLE. It is an ens which subsists of itself and sustains accidents. LEIBNITZ, to the ordinary notion of substance, adds that of action as its genuine characteristic, so that by its power of acting it may properly be distinguished from accidents. DESCARTES defines substance as a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing for its own existence. Such is his idea of God. CLAUBERG in like manner understands substance as a thing which so exists it needs no other subject for its own existence; moreover that its opposite is accident, which exists, as it were, in some other subject or whose *esse* is to be in something. But, according to the schoolmen, God is not in predicates, but is above all predicates. LOCKE adheres to the common notion of substance and does not vance beyond it, while he calls it the substratum or basis of qualities, which have the power of producing in us simple ideas, and which are commonly called accidents. WOLF. The common notion of substance is imaginary. The state of substance can be changed; whence we infer that substances are endowed with force. In substances, whose state is actually changed, there is a continuous attempt at action. Accidents cannot exist without substances. In a compound entity nothing substantial is given except simple entities. There are no substances except simple substances, and compound

entities are aggregates of simple substances. Therefore simple substance only is properly substance. It is, however, in accordance with established usage to call all compound entities, in the material world, substances. ROBERT GREEN, an Englishman, argues that substance differs from accident in the possession of active force. If there be force in a compound substance, it should result from the forces of the simple substances composing it.

In the modifications of things nothing substantial perishes or is produced. WOLF.

Substance is that which in itself possesses its own *esse*. Primary substances are such primarily, properly and principally; they are individual entities, singular substances and the fundamentals of all things, which are in them and which are predicated of them. Secondary universal substances are genera and species. They are by this author divided into most universal, universal, generic, specific and individual. He supposes primary substances to be accidents: also that there are given spiritual and incorporeal substances, as, angels and souls. DUPLEIX.

That subject in which exist all those things which we find meeting in a real thing we call substance. When we consider this, of what quality it is, we are able to attribute nothing to it, because we may remove all its qualities from it and include them among accidents. The substantial of things is therefore said to be unknown. Thus the notion of substance is imaginary, and consequently substance itself, such as we commonly imagine it, is an imaginary *ens*. DESCARTES has well observed that substance cannot be conceived of, unless by means of a certain primary determination, to which all the other determinations are referred: although he may not be regarded as having progressed so far, so long as he holds extension to be the fundamental constituent of corporeal substance, and thought, that of incorporeal substance, since something more universal is given in each. If the state of substances is changed, that they are endowed with force, follows of necessity. Let us suppose that only one substance exists, and that its state is changed; there will be given in that substance a sufficient reason of that change, and so action will be given; where-

fore, since, in a thing which acts, there must be admitted something which contains in itself a sufficient reason of the actuality of the action, and so, a certain force; as a consequence, substance itself must be endowed with force.

WOLF.

Substances like forms are simple and compound, prior and posterior, superior and inferior; but properly speaking and with regard to first principles, there are no substances given, except such as are simple, first and supreme, which are at the same time the most perfect. Yet posterior and compound substances must also be called substances, in so far as forms, attributes, changes, modes, accidents and qualities appertain to them. In like manner, every form distinct from others is a substance in so far as it is a subject in which form resides, and in so far as it is adjoined to and predicated of form. Thus substance remains substance, although the state of its form be changed. For nothing substantial perishes or is produced by variation or modification of form. In this all definitions can coincide; but to give a single definition, which shall exhaust all the qualities of substance, I scarcely believe to be possible, yet that they all do coincide can be shown. In superior substances, predicates, accidents and qualities have no place, for these are above all notion of predicates.

In order that there may be substances, they must be modifiable and able to change their states, thus they must be endowed with force. The modifications themselves, which are changes of state, or variations of forces, although they are forms, can by no means be called substances, but the operations of substance; for, regarded in themselves, the modifications are not modifiable and cannot change their state, being only the operations of substances, which latter do change their states. Thus, thought cannot be called substance, nor can sensation. For the sensory organs are the very substance of the sensations; viz.: the eye is the organic

substance of the sensation of sight; the ear, of hearing; the tongue, of taste; the brain, of all the sensations; also, the cortical glands are the organic substances of the imagination, and *along with* what is purely of the understanding they belong to thought. Therefore the sensories are substances, because they are organic forms; sensations, however, are not. The whole body is a substance composed of all organic substances. The soul is a substance whose operations are spiritual, for it is a form and indeed a spiritual form. In like manner with other things. Active and motive force ought to be conceived of as like substance, though of another nature. It is not substance, however, but only appears so.

CHAPTER VI.

MATTER—MATERIAL.

ALL matter is in continual motion. If matter does not change its place it is owing to the resistance of contiguous things. The active force in a body should be conceived to be quite as durable as the matter in it. Matter and active force are not substances. In the elements are contained the ultimate reasons of those things which are discerned in material things; consequently in simple substances is contained the ultimate reason why matter and active force appear as two substances diverse from each other. That which is determined in a compound *ens* is called matter; whence a compound *ens* is said to consist of matter. The word matter is taken more widely, so as to designate the substantial, because by means of essential determinations it is made specific, so that this particular *ens* comes forth, and not another; but from this looser signification we very properly abstain, lest while attributing matter to simple substances in its transcendental signification, we may seem to attribute it to them in its phys-

ical signification, which latter obtains in common speech, and is contained in the definition of it. Matter therefore is called matter from which [*ex quâ*], to distinguish it from a subject, which latter is called matter in which [*in quâ*], and to distinguish it from an object, which last is termed matter about which [*circa quam*].

WOLF.

Matter is presented to our consideration in three modes. 1. That it is the subject and seat of form and accidents: thus, the body is the seat of the rational soul, which is its form, and of many accidents. 2. In so far as anything is made out of it; as, out of wood. 3. As the subject of an agent; as wood, of fire. Thus we have matter in which, out of which, and by means of which. Primal matter is sometimes considered as without form and accident, and then it is mental; but natural matter is first without form, and is, as it were, before form and the subject of form and accidents. Secondary matter is an effect, it being joined to primal form. If we speak of matter as the principle of natural causes, we understand only primal matter. Primal matter when under consideration is abstruse and obscure. The ancient philosophers said that it was not, and could not be understood in the nature of things, unless by means of an indirect and imperfect conception. Such was Plato's mode of expressing it. Aristotle's thus: that that which must be considered as without form and accidents, must be understood by means of analogy and similitude, as you understand the light by means of which you perceive things to be. Aristotle says that matter is the primal subject, from which all things subsist; that all things are born at the outset from themselves and not by means of another, and that matter is that ultimate part into which things are resolved and terminated. If we consider the evident order of the creation of the world, we necessarily conceive of matter before form, as of something underlying and fundamental, from which, by changes and by series, forms come forth. Just as the Physicists say that form is derived from the potency of matter, or from a natural faculty, potency, disposition, and aptitude, which is in it, for successively receiving forms. They say that man alone and his form do not result from matter. Aristotle also knew that this form came from some other source than from matter. In passing he asserts that

primal matter is separated from all form, and that thence results all form.

DUPLEIX.

Matter is extent endowed with the force of inertia. Matter is modified by variation of figure. A substantiated phenomenon is one which appears like a substance. Matter and motive force are substantiated phenomena; yet motive force and matter necessarily appear as diverse substances. Many of the schoolmen however placed these in contrast, also regarding them as material and immaterial substances; for example, when they said that the soul was simple, they called that simple, which is not composed of quantitative parts. Unity is not a number, but is the principle of all numbers.

WOLF.

That is called *Matter* (*materia*) which is determined in order that form may exist, or, it is that from which form exists; for without matter no determinations can be given, and hence, no form; so that if from form you take away matter, nothing remains, and its substance falls into nothing; just as if you were to take away the viscera from the body, or the stones from a house, which are therefore called materials. It was in this sense that the ancients accepted the word matter—so likewise, the men of our time, although they are unwilling to confound it with the *Substantial*.

Anything *Material* (*materiale*), on the other hand, according to every use of speaking, is to-day that which is heavy, endowed with the force of inertia, and which is in space. The word by usage is taken from stones, marble, woods, and similar things, which are called materials, but to these only so far as they are inanimate and dense. The same word by no means applies to simple things, such as are spiritual substances and others. Wherefore, in order to avoid contradictions and disputes, a distinction is made between primal elements, and substances, which is the reason that such substances are called immaterial, that is, not heavy and inert, not partaking of motion, part, or extent. But in order

that dispute on this point may be avoided, it should be fully defined what *matter* is, and then what is *material*, according to the common understanding and received usage.

Matter, philosophically understood, may be attributed even to spiritual forms, for matter is that from which form is, whether you term it substance or element. Without matter from which [*ex quâ*], form never exists: just as without object, there is no sensation, for matter is the very subject which is determined. Moreover we speak of a "matter of dispute," and a matter of dispute is not anything material. Thus we have matter philosophical, physiological, and theological. Therefore matter philosophically considered is not supposed to be heavy, inert, and corporeal, but is regarded as the principle of being, and that without which there is no determination and no form; for that something which is determined is called matter. On the other hand, physical matter, or material, is only that which is found in the lowest forms, especially in angular form and in the earth. Material of this kind begins to be put off by superior forms, for, the less it is finited, the less it becomes material. Thus, the soul is not material, which is without part, extent, figure, gravity, but it does not cease to be matter, that is, the principle from which the body exists, nor does the soul itself cease to exist and subsist from its own matter, or principle, so far as it is a form. Form without matter is not an *ens*, is not determined, still less is it determinable. But the matter of the soul must not according to the vulgar acceptance and in a grossly physical sense, be conceived of as material.

From these things it appears how ideas purely critical may confuse a subject, and how the mere signification of a word may protract a discussion. All such niceties, however, are mere puerile ornamentations, and ill become men.

CHAPTER VII.

EXTENT—EXTENSION—CONTINUOUS—CONTIGUOUS—PART.

IF we represent to ourselves several things diverse from, and existing outside of, each other, as if they were in one, the notion of extension arises; so that extension is the co-existence in one, of many and diverse existences, or if you prefer it, of things existing outside of each other; and indeed is constituted by the union of many things existing outside of each other; thus it is required for the notion of extension that they be united among themselves, and that they form a one. Since in an extent there are many things, which taken together constitute the same with itself taken as a unit, and indeed which constitute the extent itself, every extent has parts, each of which exists outside of another, and which are united among themselves. That which has parts, one of which exists outside of another, and which are united among themselves, is an extent. JUNGIUS defines extension as that, on account of which corporeal substance has part outside of part. CLAUBERG defines *body* or *extent* (which, with a disciple of Descartes, are synonymous terms), as that which has part placed outside of part. Of the union of the parts they make no mention, nevertheless, they tacitly suppose it, because they conceive of extension in a body as being parts, and those parts as being united among themselves. Unlimited parts of extent regarded in the abstract, do not differ except in number. To a right line we do not attribute extension except regarded in the abstract. Indeed the parts of a line do not differ except in number. The case is the same with a solid or mathematical body; but extent of this kind is not given in the nature of things. *A*, *B*, and *C* however they be taken in extent regarded in the abstract, differ in none of their qualities, nor are intrinsic diverse determinations found in them, unless in each one's having existence proper to itself. WOLF's *Ontology*.

Contiguous things are not *continuous*. Continuity excludes the possible existence of a part diverse from, and in-

intermediate between two other parts given next to itself. That which is interrupted or not continuous renders actual or possible the existence of a part, diverse from and intermediate between two given parts. Two limited extents are called contiguous, whose surfaces mutually touch each other, so that they remain two, and by no means form one extent. So, contiguity excludes the actual existence of an intermediate third. Nothing, however, prevents a third extent from being placed between contiguous extents.

WOLF's *Ontol.*

The elements of material things exist outside of each other and are united to each other. Aggregates of elements are extended; they are also continuous. Every body arises from that which is not extended, nevertheless itself is extended, for the elements themselves of things material are not extended. Extension and continuity in a body you do not perceive unless confusedly. Extension and continuity are phenomena: for whatever is perceived confusedly, by way of the senses, is called a phenomenon. WOLF's *Cosmology*.

An *actual* part is one which is contained by its own limits; a *possible* part is one whose limits may be assigned at will. In the continuous regarded in the abstract, parts are only possible, not actual. But in a continuous series of contiguous things, the parts are actual. Contiguous parts constitute what is continuous. WOLF.

Extent is defined as that which has parts outside of parts, and thus is to be united. It is commonly believed that no form can be given, which does not consist of parts outside of parts, for there must be something to be determined, in order that form may exist, and this something we conceive of as a part. But let us see of what quality an extent ought to be, which should be said to consist of parts, and of what quality one which is without parts. In every inferior and more imperfect form, there is given extent which consists of parts, or material extent, or, what comes to the same thing, extension of matter. Therefore bodies are such extents. But in superior forms extension cannot be denied, so far as there

is form, and so far as there are essential determinations, and so far as form is actual and not ideal, and in the concrete; to say that it is without extent, would be to say that it is non-existent, or an *ens* not possible in nature. Such an extent cannot be said to consist of parts, nor of parts outside of parts, nor with the idea of breadth, length, and depth. Hence it is not corporeal. 1. Such an extent does not consist of parts; for parts, if they are contained within their own boundaries, are figured, elementary, heavy, inert, terrestrial forms; while there are none such in an extent not material, but they are either substances or forms, or if you prefer so to express it, they are such things as are determined; and those things, forms, or substances, are of no figure, gravity, or any material predicate. 2. Nor does such an extent consist of parts outside of parts; for, what is outside will be either above, below, or at the sides; and a place will then be given either at the centre, or in the surface, or somewhere, when, in the form, the before mentioned relations may have perished, as in the circle; for who will suppose any part of a circle to be above or below another? 3. Wherefore there perishes the idea of breadth, length, and depth; but that idea perishes in the form, so also the idea of extent such as has been described, but there does not perish the idea of space, and thus of extent outside of the form; for whatever is in it is without place in itself, but not without place in the universe, outside of itself.

Therefore every form is extended, even supreme and spiritual form, but it does not consist of parts such as are parts terrestrial, and forms angular, heavy, and inert, and such as are the elements of material things; but they consist of substances or forms which are determined, for there will be something determinable and determined, which must be the analogue of part.

Therefore such extent is not material, so far as material is

described as consisting of parts which are heavy and inert; but it ought rather to be spoken of as pure or substantial extent, for bodies are aggregates of substances.

Substances themselves, considered as parts in such forms, are without the idea of place, and of tendency towards a centre, or periphery, upwards, or downwards, thus there perishes the idea of breadth and length, such as is proper to every extent.

This extent, itself not material, cannot be said to occupy space in itself, but that which is without it is said to occupy space; for while within it, there is no respect of centre and place, still it occupies space in the universe.

Part signifies that which is of a form angular, terrestrial, and figured. Thus the elements of material things are parts; and because angular forms can put on the face and surface of superior forms, as the circle and the spiral, therefore even a circular part is called a part; but if it should be purely circular and spiral, it would immediately cease to be such a part.

CHAPTER VIII.

BODY—THINGS CORPOREAL.

PRIMITIVE corpuscles are those in which no reason of their composition can be assigned except in their elements. *Derivative* corpuscles are those whose reason of composition is in lesser ones. Visible bodies all consist of derivative corpuscles. The reason of the composition of those which come together in visible bodies, is contained in the qualities of the derivative corpuscles, and in the mode in which the same are joined together. Bodies are compound substances.

WOLF.

Body is a word of several meanings. It signifies, 1. *Quan-*

tity, and, in a mathematical sense, is put for the three dimensions of body conjoined with or united to solidity and matter, and sometimes altogether abstracted therefrom. 2. *Corporeal substance*; as, man, tree, stone, thus in a physical sense; *artificial bodies*, as houses, statues, or, all the works of art, not nature's; also *natural bodies*. 3. When applied to artificial things, it is matter joined to form and thus the entire body. 4. When applied to natural things, it is primal matter or the subject of natural form, which is of itself formless, but for the most part susceptible of many and diverse forms successively. Natural bodies are divided among themselves into *simple*, which are not composed of, or mixed with the matter of another body, and into *compound* and *mixed*.

DUPLIX.

Material bodies are all those which arise from the elements of things material or from so many very minute triangular or square particles; thus they are all angular forms, of whatever figure as well as composition they may be. For those triangular and square particles are primitive corpuscles, yea, the very elements themselves, from whose aggregates material bodies arise and are derived.

But animate bodies are all compound substances and forms, from their first to their last natural order, derived, and thus, compounded; but one substantial reigns in that whole body, that is the soul, and besides this substantial there is given none other force in this body. Therefore these bodies are compound substances, or simple substance alone, which is their soul, and which, by derivation, forms its own body. But what body is, has been shown above.

Each body has its own soul, which is wholly in every part of it, and which has formed its body after its own image. Other things which have been added were taken from the mineral kingdom.

CHAPTER IX.

ESSENCE—ESSENTIALS.

ESSENCE is distinguished from the other qualities which reside in an *ens*, because, while it has no intrinsic reason why it should enter into the *ens*, but ought to be regarded as the first thing in it, the other qualities which are therein or may be therein, have a reason for being in the same. Therefore essence may be defined as that which is first conceived concerning an *ens*, and in which is contained a sufficient reason why the other qualities are actually in it, or may be in it. SUAREZ says that the essence of a thing is that which is first and radical, and the inmost principle of all the actions and properties which appertain to the thing. Afterwards he asserts that it is that which is conceived first to belong to, and first to be constituted in, the *esse* of a thing, and of such a thing as it is. Again, that real essence is the principle or root of real operations or effects. DESCARTES says that essence is that leading property of any substance, which constitutes its very nature and essence, and to which all the other properties are referred: CLAUBERG.—Of all the properties which are attributed to any given thing, we are accustomed to consider one as first, chief, and inmost to the thing, which in a manner embraces all the other properties, or is certainly, as it were, their root and foundation. This especial thing we call the essence, and with respect to the properties and operations thence proceeding, we also call it the nature of the thing, but thus our ideas of essence and of nature become confused. WOLF.—Those properties in an *ens* which are not mutually inconsistent, and which, on the other hand, are not determined by each other, are called essentials, and constitute the essence of an *ens*. For example, the number three, and equality of the sides are the essentials of an equilateral triangle; and in morals it is a truth not inconsistent with itself that an action conformable to natural law may arise from a habit of the will. Essence is the first thing which is

conceived about an *ens*, and without it an *ens* cannot be. If anything is determined by means of essentials, that ought constantly to be in the *ens*. If anything is not determined by essentials, and yet is not inconsistent with the same, that thing may be in the *ens*, although it be not actually in it: on the other hand, if it is inconsistent with those same essentials, it cannot be in the *ens*. For example: it does not follow that a line drawn from the vertex to the base of a triangle is so determined by essentials, because it can be so drawn after the triangle is constructed. But it is inconsistent with an obtuse-angled triangle that one of its angles be a right angle. Again: there is no inconsistency in a stone's being white, but there is inconsistency in its being lighter than air. That which is not inconsistent with essentials, and yet is by no means determined by essentials, by the author is called *mode*, by the schoolmen, *predicable accident*. Whatsoever resides in an *ens*, that has a place either among its essentials, or its attributes, or its modes. Those things which constantly reside in an *ens*, and are not determined by other things which are in it at the same time, are in the number of its essentials: but those which are constantly in it, and are determined by other things which are in it at the same time, are attributes. By means of its essence an *ens* is possible. We understand the essence of an *ens*, when we understand the first mode by which it can come into existence, consequently by a genitive definition. Why the essentials are in the *ens*, no intrinsic reason can be given, whence it may be understood why the same are in it, as why an equilateral triangle has three sides. In the essence of an *ens* is contained the reason of those things which, besides itself, are either constantly in the same, or can be in it. All similar things have the same essence, and the essentials are similar, if the essence be similar. Essences of things are like rational or common whole numbers. For a number is a combination of units which, while they can be, are not at the same time necessarily, combined. Nevertheless, while necessity does not oppose, no unit can be taken from, and none added to the number, while it remains intact. Essences of things are immutable: so that if, as it were, any essential be taken away, or some other superadded, the essence no longer remains the essence of that *ens*, to which it had before be-

longed, but is changed into the essence of a diverse *ens*. Essences of things are immutable. The necessity which arises from the essence of an *ens* is absolute, but that which proceeds from another source does not exist, except hypothetically. Essences of things are absolutely necessary. Essentials are qualities, consequently genera and species are determined by qualities. Individuals have the same essentials, so far as they are contained under the same species, and species and inferior genera have the same essentials, so far as the species are contained under the same genus, and the inferior genera, under the same superior genus. Species and genera differ by means of essentials, which, while the other essentials remain the same, can be determined in a different manner. Constant intrinsic determinations are essentials and attributes: modes however are variable.

WOLF'S *Ontol.*

Essence is in all things and is most general, which is the reason that it can with difficulty be defined; for that which is, as it were, by all clearly conceived in individual things, by definition becomes obscure. Nor can it be presented by a single definition which shall exhaust everything which is in the whole of it; wherefore we must approach the subject in another way, and by examples solely, arrive at a clear understanding of essence and of things similar. We may then form partial definitions which can be combined into one manifest general definition.

The most general definition of essence is this, namely: Essence is essence; or this: It is what it is. Nothing can be defined by means of itself except essence; for besides it there is nothing in a subject which properly belongs to it. But this amounts to nothing, as a definition.

In every *ens* there seems to be given its *esse*, its essence and its essential, and that one flows from the other, or that one supposes the other. 1. The *esse* of a form in a universal sense is matter, its essential is its determination, its essence is the form itself. 2. The things which constitute the essence of

a circle are its periphery, its diameters, and its centre. Without these there is no circle; and if they are not in it, they must be supposed to be in it. 3. The essence of a triangle is that it consists of three sides and three angles. 4. But the essence of form resides in each single form as its universal, nor does it recede therefrom; thus every principal essence is deduced from that which is first and supreme or universal. 5. The essence of an animal is that it enjoys a soul and a body. This holds good in all genera and species. 6. Human essence, besides the specific properties already mentioned, is that it enjoys a rational mind; otherwise it is not man. 7. The very universal essence in every body is the soul, whence is derived the body. She rules in all particulars. Thus there are given, as it were, differences of essence which are specific and singular. Thus we say that this is the essence or the soul of a thing. If the essence or soul of a thing recedes, the thing dies. 8. The essentials of a muscle are its fibres. Specifically they are the fibres determined in a peculiar manner, or the form. Thus essence and form will agree. Therefore the reigning essence in all things is called their *soul*, which is in all things from the very beginning, and is the very beginning. The other things which depend upon it are its body. But the *essence of the body* is the form which is made up of the naked essential determinations or those of the soul. The essence of a special form occurs in the word itself or denomination of that form: as, triangle, quadrangle, rational animal, or man, and thus in an easy manner it is specifically designated, of what quality it is, namely the genus is designated and on the other hand, the specific difference.

CHAPTER X.

ATTRIBUTE.

IF anything is determined by means of essentials, that must constantly be in the *ens*. Those things which are determined by means of essentials are called *attributes*. If anything be determined by means of all the essentials taken together it is called a *proper attribute*, but if only by some of them, it is called a *common attribute*. Thus the three sides of the triangle are the essentials of an equilateral triangle; the number three of the angles is a common attribute; the three angles equal among themselves is a proper attribute. Whatever is in an *ens*, has a place either among its essentials, or its attributes, or its modes. Attributes are constantly in an *ens*; modes may be, or may not be in it. Those things which are constantly in an *ens*, and are not determined by means of other things, which are in it at the same time, are to be ranked in the number of essentials. But those things which are constantly in an *ens*, and are determined by means of other things, which are in it at the same time, are attributes. For if we embrace in our idea all the things which are in an *ens*, we discern in that idea that some things are determined by others, which are in the *ens* at the same time; and in enumerating what those things are, which serve to determine the rest, we understand that certain things which are in the *ens* must be put in the first place. These are not mutually inconsistent with each other, and nevertheless are not determined by other things which are in the *ens* at the same time. Why attributes are present, a sufficient reason is contained in the essentials. Why common attributes are present, a sufficient reason is contained in some of the essentials; why proper attributes are present, a sufficient reason is contained in all the essentials. Those things, which are of the same species, have the same attributes and proximate possibilities of the same modes, likewise also what are called remote conditional possibilities. Things which are of the

same genus have the same common attributes, and possibilities of the same modes, which are like common attributes. Things which have the same proper attributes and possibilities of the same modes, which are like common attributes, are of the same species. Things which have the same common attributes, or possibilities of the same modes, which are like common attributes, are referred to some same genus. Essences of things are absolutely necessary; attributes of things are absolutely necessary. The proximate possibility of mode is absolutely necessary. Attributes of things and proximate possibilities of modes are attributes and modes unchangeable in themselves. Quantity being excluded, they are qualities; and they are also accidents. Attributes are not modifiable, but unchangeable, and incapable of other determinations successively; therefore they are accidents. The possibility of modes, whose reason is contained in essentials, must be included among attributes; for example, the divisibility of a parallelogram by its diagonal into two equal parts is determined by the parallelism of its sides and by their number, and so it is an attribute of the parallelogram.

WOLF.

Words predicable and attributive are *five*. 1. *Genus*, the supreme and most general, always genus, even when subaltern, which last in a certain respect is genus or species. 2. *Species*, the lowest and most special, always species, and attributed immediately to individuals, even when subaltern, which last in a certain respect is genus and species. 3. *Difference*, either essential, constituting a part of the definition or essence of the thing, or accidental, which does not regard the essence of the thing. 4. *Property*, which is applicable, *either* generally to a whole subject and not to it alone; *or* to one subject only, and not generally and entirely to this; *or* entirely to one subject and to it alone, but not always; *or* entirely to one subject, and to it alone and always. 5. *Accident*, common and separable from its effective subject; or inseparable from its subject, unless by means of perception.

DUPLEIX.

Besides the essentials in any given *ens*, more things are required. Essentials alone do not constitute an *ens*, that it

be such as it is. That it is a form, it derives from its essentials; that it is such a form, from its determinations; that it can be such, both from its essentials and its attributes. That it can be what it is, is an attribute. That essence is in anything is an attribute, and thence an accident.

The essentials of a muscle are its motor fibres: its attributes are that the motor fibres are connected by their own bands, that they are surrounded by a common membrane, and that they are thus fitted for producing a certain action. It is an attribute, so far as the muscle is determined to a special action, that it consists of a tendon, and that it is fastened to a small bone, or to a movable and an immovable part. The common membrane itself, the tendons, and the rest, have their own essentials, but they nevertheless are attributes of the other. The essentials of the eye are its fibres, its vessels, its humors; its attributes are the possibilities of its modes, of receiving phenomena by sight—and so likewise its very form and the things accessory to its essentials.

An attribute of the angular form is that it is hard, heavy, angular. This attribute reigns universally in all species and individuals. Its essentials are the elements, from which come its essential determinations, namely, that they are continually opposite and repugnant, thus contrary to each other, whence comes gravity.

The attributes of the circular form are that it can be expanded and contracted; that all its diameters meet in the centre; that mobility is confined to its periphery, outside of its centre; thus motion and rest at the same time in one body, or liberty and co-action; that it can be revolved about an axis; can resist and yield; can undergo changes of state; that it can be the measure of angular forms, and can give the sines of all angles whatsoever.

We cannot know what any form, body, or subject, is,

unless we know its attributes. Thus we must know the attributes of the circular form; that it can be contracted and expanded; can yield and resist; can be turned about an axis; and at the same time that the direction of its revolutions may be reversed; that it refers every motion to the centre, and that all rest is lost at the periphery; that it measures every triangular form; that it has a certain perpetual regard to the angular, and yet has no angle, no plane, no opposite direction, except in one place, or in the centre, where direction is absolute. These by some are called predicates, because they are determined by essentials, but they are proper attributes, and like proper attributes, common attributes are to be distinguished from them.

That is a proper attribute, which can be attributed to that *ens*, and not to another. That is a common attribute which can be attributed to things superior, and reigns everywhere.

CHAPTER XI.

PREDICATE.

PREDICATES are absolute which are attributed to their subject absolutely without any condition added. Predicates become hypothetical under a given condition; they are not supposed as possible, unless in potency.

Whatsoever is within an *ens*, and whatsoever can be in it, that can be predicated concerning the *ens*, and is called a predicate. Thus it is a universal word, and general term for all essentials, attributes, accidents, and modes.

From predicates which agree, and which do not agree or are inconsistent, every *ens* may be known, what it is, and of what quality it is; for an *ens* is described by mere predicates. They are so many characters and indications of the

ens. Predicates also are set forth by means of types and representations, so that when all the essence and nature cannot be described, this may be done by means of similitudes.

CHAPTER XII.

SUBJECT.

THAT is called a *subject* in which all these predicates and adjuncts reside. Every substance is a determined subject. It is that, concerning which something is predicated; and that which is described and defined is a subject.

CHAPTER XIII.

AFFECTION.

WOLF says that under *affection* are comprehended both attributes and modes, namely, predicates both intrinsic and extrinsic. Hence (he says) that predication is the same as affection.

But every affection supposes in the *ens* an active and a passive, acting and reacting, giving and receiving. It also supposes a form, possibility of modes, likewise essentials so determined, as well as mutability of state. Whether this be in one subject, in which as it were several things are considered, or among several subjects, in order that there may be an affection, there will be that which affects and that which is affected. What thence results is called an affection. The one subject is not always affected as are the states of the affecting subject, but something intermediate arises; indeed,

the one is affected in a contrary manner; for there is an application of the modes of the other, which causes the appropriate affection to result therefrom. The internal sensory is affected by the eye with its sight; but the affection is such as is the internal sensory and its intermediate; yea, also the intellect contributes to it; so that there are three things which are affected. Every affection proceeds as far as to the first substantial in all bodies.

CHAPTER XIV.

ACCIDENTS.

THAT which is not modifiable is an accident. Gravity in a stone is an attribute. Color or whiteness in a stone is an accident. Accidents are quantity, magnitude, figure, situation, space, place, time, duration. Attributes and modes are accidents. The essence of a compound *ens* consists of nothing but mere accidents. Accidents are intrinsic and extrinsic. Substance is not an accident, but accidents cannot exist without substance. Accidents derogate from nothing.

Therefore accidents are all those things which are not substances, and thus not subjects; for accidents belong to substances. Intrinsic accidents are those which are within substance, so far as that means, at the same time, a subject in which form is, and in which modes obtain; but in primal substance, accidents cannot be given, because from it they proceed; otherwise you would put accidents before substance.

Thus substance itself is the subject of accident; for in compound substance nothing is given except accidents.

CHAPTER XV.

CONTINGENTS.

A CONTINGENT is that which may be or may not be, or which is not necessary: as, the color of a stone, the erudition of a man. So it is changeable, and has not a sufficient reason in the essence. Contingents have no necessary existence, except a hypothetical one. A contingent *ens* has a sufficient reason outside of itself in another *ens*. There is such a thing as a series of contingents.

Contingents indeed happen from a cause not necessary, which appears necessary to us, as from Providence. Matters of chance all appear as contingents, while they flow from necessary causes unknown to us; as, for example, the slaughter of the infants by Herod. And again, the fashioning of our own characters has a necessary cause in the state of the soul. Every Divine Providence proceeds by means of mere contingents, as in the case of Joseph, and the like; so that nothing may appear as necessary, although it be necessary, in this supposed state of things. Nothing is given purely necessary in physics, but it becomes necessary, this or that being given or supposed. Thus contingents might be said to be the causes of necessities, and necessities the causes of contingents, and so they might be confounded. Among contingents might be placed the highest necessity, but we do not so regard it.

CHAPTER XVI.


MODES—MODIFICATION.

EVERY change of a durable thing consists in variety of modes. Variation and succession of modes is modification. All modes are variable. Modes and determinations are almost the same. The soul is modifiable, because it can have perceptions of other things and desires for them. A stone is modifiable because warm or cold, dry or moist, can be added to it. Every mode consists in limits or limitations. If it consists in only one limit, it is simple.

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THE END.



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